main.js · part 299

60 text occurrences from desktop/Cursor.app/Contents/Resources/app/extensions/cursor-agent-host/dist/main.js, part 299. Every entry preserves the shipped literal and its saved verdict or selection reason.

File contents and all parts · All files

Error fetching file contents for diff

Generated-file detection failed; continuing without it

git patch-id failed with code ${e}: ${i}

${t.join("\n")}

diff --git a/${r.path} b/${r.path}

--- /dev/null

+++ b/${r.path}

@@ -0,0 +1${1===n?"":`,${n}`} @@

GetDiffResponseTooLarge: ${e} bytes exceeds the ${w} byte limit

${t.id} 

realpath returned ENOENT but lstat found a non-symlink entry

Write blocked: `${e}` is a dangling symlink${t.symlinkTarget?` (target: ${t.symlinkTarget})`:""}. Cannot verify it does not point to a protected file.

 (target: ${t.symlinkTarget})

Write blocked: cannot verify `${e}` -- permission denied resolving symlinks (${t.errno}).

Write blocked: `${e}` has a symlink loop (${t.errno}). Cannot verify target.

Write blocked: cannot verify `${e}` -- ${t.errno}: ${t.message}.

Write blocked: unknown resolution status for `${e}`.

Object expected.

Symbol.asyncDispose is not defined.

Symbol.dispose is not defined.

Object not disposable.

An error was suppressed during disposal.

Result of MCP allowlist checks at user and team levels per tool call.

${e} blocked: cannot verify ${t} `${r}` while resolving symlinks. This can happen when access is denied or the path contains a symlink loop.

${t} ${r.join(" ")}

${t} ${s.join(" ")}

Team repo blocklist

This reads a file outside your workspace and requires approval under your team's read policy.

This reads a file outside your workspace.

Team repo blocklist

${e[0]} ${e.slice(1)}

Out of workspace

Protected config file: ${_[_.length-1]??""}

Protected config file: ${e}

Workspace write

working directory

Team repo blocklist

Shell permissions: evaluating shell command

Shell permissions: prompting for empty allowlist

Smart allowlist: classifier result received

Command blocklist: commands require approval

In blocklist: ${T.join(", ")}

Smart allowlist: checking commands against lists

Not in allowlist: ${t}

Smart allowlist: all commands in allowlist, will check security

Shell permissions: prompting after parser miss

Parser failed to parse command (possible bypass)

Parser found no commands (possible bypass)

Shell permissions: blocked by readonly mode

Shell permissions: all commands allowed by sandbox policy

Shell permissions: auto-approved shell command

Hook requested approval: ${$}

Hook requested approval

Not in allowlist: ${t}

Delete protection is enabled

In team blocklist: ${F.teamBlocklistedCommands.map(e=>e.command.name).join(", ")}

Shell permissions: commands not in team allowlist

Not in team allowlist: ${t}

Shell permissions: requesting shell approval

Shell allowlist is empty